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Transcript of: "Sibel Edmonds Explains Erdogan's Fall From Grace"


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0:11 James Corbett: Welcome back. This is James Corbett of CorbettReport.com, and you are tuned into the BoilingFrogsPost.com EyeOpener Report for this week, where we are joined on the line once again for an exclusive interview by BoilingFrogsPost.com founder and editor Sibel Edmonds. And today we're going to be talking about a new article that she has posted up on BoilingFrogsPost.com that's garnering quite a bit of attention. It's under the headline "Turkish PM Erdoğan: The Speedy Transformation of an Imperial Puppet." And as the title might indicate, it goes through the very interesting fall from grace of this former globalist insider golden boy who is now very much on the outside, and is facing some difficulties both within and without from his people and from people around the world. So let's take a look at this article, and roll up our sleeves and take a look at some of the facts going on here. So Sibel, great to have you here. Why don't you just tell us a little bit about this article and what prompted you to start writing it.

1:10 Sibel Edmonds: Well, as you know, James, I have been following the politics, Turkish politics, very closely for many, many years -- for over a decade. I used to live in Turkey; and my case with the FBI, my entire whistleblowing, had to do with the US-Turkish operations that became the state secrets privilege. And on the other hand, I have tried to stay away in terms of writing and being public about Turkey's own internal politics for several reasons. One main reason had to do with a lot of attacks that I endured [laughs] about ten years ago. Because, it was interesting: I was an outcast here in the United States -- this is the government who thought I was betraying the US government's operations -- but because of the media in Turkey, they also portrayed me in Turkey as a person who is betraying Turkey and is working against Turkey, or worked against Turkey.

2:09 So I said, "I'm gonna set it aside, and I am just gonna focus on a lot of issues that we are covering here." But of course, as you know, with our Gladio series, with the many, many articles I have written, I have been dealing with a lot of issues and cases that have many Turkish angles in them, including the infamous imam Fethullah Gülen and his network here in the United States, in Central Asia and Caucasus, and also in Turkey.

2:39 Well, I have to add this: about a couple of days ago via Twitter, I received many requests from ordinary Turkish people who were asking for my opinion about, "Well, what is your take on what's happening with Prime Minister Erdoğan? Where do you stand on this? Would you please provide us with some analysis?" And I think that kind of gave me the needed push to sit down and put together this first analysis piece that ended up being really long. But in order to do it justice, I had to include a lot of history and contacts and the chronology of what has been taking place. And hopefully it has been informative. I don't think Turkish people need that that much, because they are right in the thick of it, but it's mainly for the US audience to see how we go about this, play this game of regime change and regime installment -- which, I call it the reverse-engineering. [laughs]

3:37 You know, we build puppets, and we build them up; and when their time comes -- I call it the expiration date -- that's when we bring them down. And it's almost like an overnight process that is amazing: amazing to see and to put together. So when they are in one place, people can observe and say, "Wow, how can somebody go from angel to evil-doer," you know? And how the US media, a lot of global mainstream media, are acting as the branch of the establishment, the powers, to make this possible: to be able to shape the views on, you know, "This person was an angel, and now he's a terrorist. He's a dictator, he's an evil, he's a despot." And for people to pause and say, "How does this occur, this whole process?"

4:26 James: Well, I think your article does a great job of pointing out that transformation that's taken place. And of course, I think the iconic image in most Americans' minds would probably be Donald Rumsfeld's golden handshake to Saddam Hussein back in the 1980s, and then the invasion that came a little bit later when he fell out of favor. So we are seeing a similar transformation happening with Erdoğan, who has been called by Obama -- as you pointed out in your article -- one of the top five partners of the US around the globe, or whatever rhetoric he was using at the time. And of course that has definitely changed, in recent months especially.

4:58 And I think a lot of even casual observers of what's happening in Turkey will know what happened with the Gezi Park protests; but of course this is part of a much broader agenda, as you point out in your article. And you do tie it back to Fethullah Gülen's network -- which, for listeners out there that don't remember, we did talk about Fethullah Gülen at some length in our Gladio B series. So I will, as always, once again invite you to go and re-watch, or watch for the first time, that series if you haven't watched it before. But let's start tying this together. What, exactly... why is this transformation taking place, and who is behind it?

5:34 Sibel: Uh, sure. The answer is multi-parted, as always. We don't have, usually, a linear, simple answer. But the fall of Erdoğan -- if we start viewing it as such, as this fall from the grace in the eyes of the Western powers, especially the CIA -- started with a rift between Erdoğan and Gülen. Fethullah Gülen's network, the imams, they played a major role in bringing this party into power, in shaping the views and starting the movement. And the current administration -- Erdoğan's and Gul's -- their administration came into power with the full support and backing of Gülen.

6:18 And I have to distinguish: when I say "Gülen," Gülen is just a symbol. I mean, currently he's a man who has lost most of his mental faculty. He is being considered as senile. They are kind of hiding him; but his name, his brand -- it is a brand. It's a brand that was really promoted and established by the CIA after 1997, once Fethullah Gülen, this mullah, this imam, was brought into United States. He wanted to overthrow Turkey's secular government, and he was wanted in Turkey. So they brought him here, and they actually initially settled him near Langley, [laughs] Virginia. And they basically groomed him and let him set up a network. And this was... the people within the networks are all the CIA people.

7:05 And people can look into it. It's very easy to find out all the names: from CIA's Graham Fuller, to Abramowitz. And he got settled; and today, in the United States, he's been living here for 15 years. His net worth is around $20 to $25 billion dollars' worth, OK? Nobody knows where his money comes from. He has established charter schools in the United States. Well, outside the United States, since 1998, Gülen's branch have -- together with the CIA -- have set up over 350 mosques all over Central Asia and Caucasus. And madrasas. These are, you know, the madrasas, the Islamic religious schools.

7:49 And they ended up getting kicked out of a lot of these countries, because the regimes there, they realized that this was a propaganda and, actually, operations under the CIA to basically Islamicize these former Soviet Union states. But they remained very strong in other former Soviet Union states such as Azerbaijan. But of course in Turkey, also, he started building an empire, network. And that was by pouring money and establishing a network within Turkish media; and he slowly began to take over the Turkish media, the influential arms of the Turkish media. He started actually planting people within the Turkish military and Turkish police forces. So his network has been very, very active.

8:39 And this same network brought into power Erdoğan by promoting Erdoğan strongly. Because Erdoğan's political party, fair and square, won in 1997. They were elected by the people. But at that point -- this was during Gladio A -- the switch had not taken place completely. Turkish military, with the backing of the United States, they came and they banned the party. They put Erdoğan in jail; they put other party members in jail. They said, "Look, in Turkey, votes don't count. We don't approve of him, so even if you gathered 45 million votes for him, we're not going to let him come into power." Well, that entire situation changed. In 2002, the party got elected again; but this time, the military had to stay silent and step aside and let them actually come into power. So, what took place between 1997 and 2002?

9:33 Well, what took place was Gladio B, Fethullah Gülen coming to US, and the strategy changing to this Plan B. So they were very close. But what happens is, when you are popular among the public as a political leader -- and in this case, it is Erdoğan -- you... it comes with a little bit of confidence increase, and you become a little bit... give in to some hubris. You say, "You know what? I am very popular. People love me. Look at the polls! So I don't have to bow to this imam all the time. There are things that I want to do, whether or not he agrees or not." So he started getting a little bit overconfident that he is popular and in fact he doesn't have to bow so much to Gülen.

10:19 So that's one, one element that began taking place about a few years ago. Then came Erdoğan's very strong position on Israel. [laughs] And he became, kind of, really tough. I mean, he talked the talk; a little bit walked the walk; and guess what? Of all the powers of all the parties in Turkey, all the influence, the first criticism for his being tough and brave on Israel actually came from Fethullah Gülen. Fethullah Gülen publicly condemned Erdoğan's strong statements against Israel.

10:55 And by the way, as a side note: Fethullah Gülen's biggest promoters outside the CIA here in the United States has been the Israel lobby. And again, people can actually Google: "Fethullah Gülen," "Gülen Movement," and put "Israel lobby," -- whether it's AIPAC, whether it is through APC -- and they will see that Gülen has been enjoying a very powerful backing of the Israel lobby. I mean, you're looking at an Islamic mullah, this imam, and you're looking at Israel lobby backing him. That itself should raise the questions for people.

11:31 So Fethullah Gülen said, "Yeah, yeah, yeah, that is not what we do here; so you'd better shut up and stop criticizing Israel, OK? I don't approve of it." So that was number two. So the rift began becoming wider, and the separation became wider. Then, of course, we had the issue of Syria: and that's number three.

11:52 As we know, we broke the story of Turkey and the camps within Turkey actually training and arming and sending the rebels from... you know, the Syrian rebels, back into Syria. And this was all orchestrated by the United States. A lot of these trainings, a lot of these armings took place through the İncirlik base -- this is a US airbase -- in Turkey. Fully supported... not only supported, it was ordered by the United States. Under the order of the United States, the Turkish government began preparing these rebels to go and oust Assad. And things were going fine as far as the US and Turkey doing this.

12:37 But then, of course, unexpected developments started taking place. One, we had the idea becoming unpopular here in the United States, so Obama didn't have the support of the popular view here in the United States. Then we had Russia stepping in. So US quickly backtracked and said, "OK, we're not gonna go with that plan with ousting Assad à la Libya. It's not gonna work. What we did in Libya is not gonna work because we have other elements in place and it's not... the idea, the notion is not popular here in the United States."

13:15 When that happened, well, this whole notion was extremely unpopular in Turkey. When Erdoğan, the Turkish military and Turkish government, they started implementing the United States' order on opposing Assad, on arming and training the rebels: well, Turkish people hated that. Because Turkey has had a pretty good relationship with Assad and Syria. It's another Muslim country; it's a neighbor Muslim country. So that idea, to begin with, was very unpopular. So with US backtracking and Turkey being exposed as the training grounds for anti-Assad, well, Erdoğan ended up standing alone. [laughs]

14:01 And it was like, "What happened here? Because the United States guaranteed that this was gonna be fair and quick, just like we did it with Libya. Now I'm unpopular with my own people -- a lot of people are getting pissed, they have gotten pissed with what I have done -- and I don't have the backing of the United States for what we were doing. So I'm the one who has to eat the crow here." So that really, really, really angered Erdoğan in that. So that's number three element.

14:32 So, with him becoming a little bit more unpopular with the public because of Syria position, unpopular with Gülen, and the rift getting wider and becoming a bigger rift between the two: we had those Gezi Park... which started with this park which was not a huge, ginormous issue. And you had the environmentalists in Turkey -- rightfully so -- standing up and protesting. Well, Fethullah Gülen seized upon this opportunity. So he took a real protest, that was the people's protest, with his network; and he started bringing in his network and his people. And of course Erdoğan saw what was happening, and he actually started speaking up on this issue, saying, "I am seeing foreign elements, I am seeing outside elements actually guiding and provoking people in this case."

15:24 And then, of course, when you come down the road, then: in the past six to nine months, this protest, again, being hijacked to a large degree by Gülen -- which, when I say Gülen, this is CIA-backed Gülen -- and it is not, basically, the pure people protesting against Erdoğan. Which, again: we see it over and over. We have been seeing it in Egypt. We have been seeing it elsewhere in the world. When you have people expressing their discontents, their unhappiness; and they stand up for their rights and they protest; you get the outside powers saying, "Let's use this for our own goals and objectives." And that's exactly what we have been seeing with Erdoğan.

16:10 And number five elements is, of course, as we have illustrated in this article. Suddenly the US media, the world media in the United Kingdom, here in the United States, they started pairing those very famous and infamous adjectives with Erdoğan: "dictator," "despot," "corrupt," you know? And in fact, another very interesting thing is a very, very old news from 2002, 2004 on al-Qadi -- Yasin al-Qadi -- which has been known for over ten years. And then suddenly -- and in fact it was covered up by the US media when we were trying to expose it -- and now they're even bringing back those guys. "Guess what? Prime Minister Erdoğan is very intimately tied with al-Qaeda financiers, al-Qadi."

17:00 So again, it is part of the modus operandi we have been seeing so much, with the media -- the mainstream media -- being part of it; and, of course, being orchestrated by the CIA and the establishment. And that's where we are right now with Erdoğan.

17:18 James: Well, that paints a very vivid picture, and I think that does cover a lot of the different angles there. But I'm still a little bit unclear, then, if this falling out between Erdoğan and Gülen is really, ultimately, a falling out between Erdoğan and the CIA. What is the CIA's stake in this? What are they hoping to achieve in Turkey, and what are they hoping to replace Erdoğan with?

17:36 Well, what it was initially, with letting Erdoğan and AKP coming into power, was they were the symbolic portion of the powers. So, you have the symbolic people: it's no different from what we see anywhere in the world, including here in the United States. It's like Obama: I mean, it's not about Obama; it's not about Obama's ideas. This is not about Obama's wars or George Bush's. It is the establishment behind Obama and the establishment behind George W. Bush; and it is the CIA; it is the military-industrial complex. Well, they had their puppet there, knowing fully that the power behind it was them -- meaning through Fethullah Gülen. That they were going to implement policies, they were going to set the foreign policy agenda.

18:25 So that was, to begin with, the notion; and it worked. That's why he was very popular. The Turkish government, this was advertised as the model of democracy for the rest of the Middle East. This is what the United States wants, and wanted, for Egypt; for Libya; for Syria, instead of Assad. They want to have these puppet regimes, what they tagged as moderate Islam, and put them in place.

18:52 Well, the rift between Erdoğan and Gülen actually gets in the way; because through Gülen's network -- which, Erdoğan knows very well, that is CIA's network -- this was going to be basically their way, their channel, being channeled through AKP and implemented. So, number one, they saw that rift, and... seeing that they are losing control of one of their boys. It's not the case with the President: they have no problem with Gul. Gul has been a good butler, he's been serving Gülen's... all Gülen's network's agenda-setting, et cetera -- but not with Erdoğan.

19:31 Then, Erdoğan further pissed off the powers. Because when this started taking place, Erdoğan said, "You know something? I am going to stand up, OK? I am going to now, for maybe the first time, watch out for Turkey's interests. That huge order we were going to place with you, $2 billion dollars' worth or $5 billion dollars' worth, for these weapons? I'm not gonna purchase it from you and your companies..." -- being the United States. "I'm gonna buy that from China." This is violating one of the top commandments of the United States and NATO empires: you don't do that. A NATO ally is purchasing their weapons, military weapons, from China? And of course, we saw a lot of screaming.

20:18 So he ended up pissing off the United States military-industrial complex and NATO. Further, he stood up even further and said, "You know something? We are tired of this. For the past 25 years, 30 years we have been trying to enter EU, and you're not doing it; and we are tired of this game. In fact, we want to align ourselves with SCO" -- you know, the Shanghai Cooperation [Organization]. And they actually put forward their request for candidacy. Again, that's another commandment being violated.

20:47 So you're looking at some... a puppet that decided to rebel against the puppet-masters. And when you do that -- I don't care if you are Mubarak in Egypt [laughs] or if you are in Turkey -- that is when the expiration data stamp gets placed on you. First of all, they have to make an example of him. What happens if you start having Romania or some of the other countries in the Middle East that are under our power saying, "Well, Erdoğan did it. Didn't you say he's a model democracy? We are gonna say, 'Well you know what? This country is providing a better price and a more reasonable;' and then we are gonna purchase our military equipment from them, or from Russia, or from China."

21:32 This cannot... they would not let this happen. So they have to make an example of Erdoğan. And for Erdoğan, too, they have made examples of other people for Erdoğan to see. I mean, for Erdoğan right now, they are saying -- and this is behind the scenes, we are not gonna hear this right now -- they are saying, "A., you can back off. Bow, repent. Take back everything; start kissing Israel's butt; and you're not ordering from China; you back off from this SCO; start apologizing and kissing imam Gülen's feet, the network's: we'll let you stay. So, that's your option one."

22:13 "Option number two: you can quietly resign and go away. Because we already have your replacement thought out; because this is all planned. So, that's your option two." All Turkish Presidents, all Turkish politicians are corrupt. He is no more corrupt than the rest of them before him. So he has accumulated tens of millions of dollars, so he can settle in the United Kingdom -- that's where everybody goes, England [laughs] -- or he can come to the United... that's your option two: quietly go.

22:43 "Number three, you can wait for us to take you out. And in that case, two scenarios can happen. You can go à la Saddam and Gaddafi: we can sodomize you right there in Taksim Square where Gezi Park happened and kill you, OK? -- and that is if you want to spill the beans." Because Erdoğan may. Now, they are... well, Erdoğan has to watch out for his own life, too; but the whole thing is: if he's not a coward, he's gonna spill beans of how this has been operating, how the powers have been actually taking over. "So, if you do that, you're gonna go à la Gaddafi, and you're gonna go à la Saddam Hussein."

23:20 "Or you can be a coward like Mubarak; because Mubarak could have spilled so many beans too. We let you live; you will be in some prison, then maybe your health will go bad and, again, we will take you to the United Kingdom; [laughs] and that's where you end up." Well, what I'm trying to tell you is the scenario is so identical that it almost makes it, in a way, boring -- of how we implement... this is how we operate. And this is the situation Erdoğan is today, and these are the options he has. Now, whether or not he is going to bow or he is going to get tough, we are going to see it in the next couple of months. It's not gonna drag much longer.

24:01 James: Again, excellent points. And I thought that the points about the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Erdoğan's commitment to trying to tease Putin into inviting him into the Shanghai Five, et cetera, that you point our in your article: it's all very much to the point. So we have this picture.

24:19 But you have raised the specter of Yasin al-Qadi. And for those who don't know about al-Qadi, of course, he has been designated by the US government itself as a suspected financier of terrorism and an al-Qaeda terrorist financial wizard, or what have you. And of course, this brings in all sorts of different aspects: including, of course, the FBI investigation into al-Qadi, and the fact that the FBI and the United States government has known for years and years -- as you point out -- of his suspected links to Erdoğan. So why is it being brought out now, when Erdoğan is fallen from grace? Obviously, it's part of this bigger picture. But this does lead us into the question of the FBI and their own investigations into what's happening; and Robert Wright, and Operation Green Quest, and all of these types of connections. Let's talk a little bit about that.

25:12 Sibel: Sure. I mean, with al-Qadi: the FBI had been investigating al-Qadi since mid-1990s. And one of the main centers of al-Qadi -- Yasin al-Qadi's -- operations, was in Chicago. Interestingly, Gladio B's center of operation also -- this was even before they switched to Gladio B -- was Chicago. Because you and I covered that with Abdullah Çatlı, who was a most wanted man; and he went to UK; and from UK, while he was still most wanted, he came to Chicago. He was given Green Card, and he actually went to Beijing, and from there to [East] Turkestan, Uyghuristan, a.k.a. [Xinjiang]: it goes by three names. And he also went to Azerbaijan for the assassination plot, back then when the father Aliyev was not planning to fall into the western camp -- he was still in the Russian, Soviet camp.

26:04 So, Chicago has always been the center. And as you mentioned -- Robert Wright, John Vincent -- it was... there was a big investigation of al-Qadi and his terrorist networks and his terrorist financing, financiering, that he was implementing from Chicago; from Saudi Arabia; from Turkey. And this was all also involved in Operation B Gladio, so it was not just some al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. That had nothing to do with al-Qadi. Most of his financing took place for Chechens, OK? It happened during the Balkans.

26:40 So Yasin al-Qadi was one of our guys, CIA guys, with the Turkish network together, having these terrorist-related operations going on. But every time FBI wanted to go and snatch the guy, the State Department and the CIA would step in, and they wouldn't let it happen. Then we had 9/11 taking place, and this was when we had Robert Wright coming out, talking about it and saying, "They stopped the investigation," -- "they" being the United States government -- "We had one of the financiers, and they didn't let us pursue him; they didn't let us capture him."

27:19 So by this time, al-Qadi was actually declared -- even by the United States -- that yes, he was in fact the financier. But even after he was declared, they gave him -- the United States government -- enough time to pack his stuff and go to Albania. It was like, "Oops, too late: we can't catch al-Qadi. He is gone." So he continued his operation -- again, this is the Operation Gladio B -- with the Turkish operatives in Central Asia, in Caucasus, out of Albania.

27:52 Then, of course, they dragged their foot -- this is the United States. The State Department worldwide declared him as the financier of 9/11 and a wanted man. And they said, "Oh, he is in Albania. And we are going to request Albanians to turn him over. We have his address; everything," right? Well, they made sure it took about two weeks between the time they asked, requested Albania; until he actually went to Turkey. And again, in Albania he had Albanian passports. In Turkey, he was already a Turkish resident there.

28:24 So he left Albania, and the US said, "Oops, we couldn't catch him in Albania; he is not there any longer." [laughs] "He is in Turkey." So the United States told Turkey: they said -- nod-nod, wink-wink -- "We want you to give this guy back. We want him here: he is one of the top financiers of 9/11." And we know that in Turkey, you don't even take a piss without the green light and permission from the United States. Turkey, for the first time ever, told the United States, "We don't have extradition treaty with you; and he hasn't violated any Turkish laws. We are tough: we are a very tough nation, and we're not gonna hand him over to you." And the United States said, "Oh, OK." And the case ended.

29:11 Now, al-Qadi, he owns -- actually, he has ownership in several banks [laughs] in Turkey, including in Cyprus. And again, he is going to Azerbaijan. And again, we covered this stuff with Zawahiri. You're looking at the same... same operation team, you're looking at. And he stayed there for years. And meanwhile, he's also traveling globally. Not only to Azerbaijan: he's going to London for his business matters. And he got some top attorneys and basically told the United Nations, "You need to un-declare me as a terrorist." [laughs] So the United Nations took him off the list, and the US basically covered up this whole thing. How could this guy in Turkey, running these operations -- which is for United States, for the CIA operations -- in Central Asia and Caucasus...

29:58 And the issue was completely covered up. As you know, the media here in the US never really covered al-Qadi. You won't find more than a handful of articles. And then, suddenly, lo and behold: with Erdoğan, they leaked the fact that, "Here are the pictures of Erdoğan's sons getting into this $10 or $20 million dollar deal with al-Qadi, the al-Qaeda top financier. Here is a partnership between this member of Erdoğan family and al-Qadi, who is al-Qaeda's top financier." [laughs] And that's exactly what we are seeing.

30:39 And another very interesting thing that is happening: some of these leaks are coming, of course, through Fethullah Gülen's network within the Turkish police, even to a certain degree within Turkish MIT -- and of course, all of these are backed by the CIA. But interestingly, there are a lot of these leaks that are happening that they are attributing to WikiLeaks. Now, WikiLeaks had this information for however many years, and it's very interesting that supposedly they are getting these from WikiLeaks, and when it's really needed by Gülen and CIA network to bring down Erdoğan.

31:15 And I find that highly puzzling, and very, very questionable as well: that, how come... are these leaks that were out there and now suddenly being rediscovered? Or are we now talking about new WikiLeaks leaks that are being strategically timed and put out there? I mean, if it's the latter, then I would be highly puzzled and troubled, to say the least.

31:43 James: Absolutely. Well, just another interesting piece of this ongoing, unfolding puzzle. And we've already talked about this to a certain extent, but perhaps we should just reiterate about how this... what's happening in Turkey right now is part of a pattern that's played itself out in numerous different places in the past few years: Egypt, Libya, Syria. Do you see this as simply another iteration of the exact same thing, or are we seeing something slightly different happening in Turkey this time around?

32:14 Sibel: Well, that's the empire's wish; but Turkey is not Egypt or Libya. You're looking at a totally different dynamics here in Turkey. And one of the things that I really find amazing is the level of awareness among the Turks. Number one, you don't have this two-party system that works really good for idiots in the United States -- you have Democrats and Republicans, which makes it so easy to just take one and work another against another. In Turkey, you have multiple factions and parties. So it is much harder to be able to, basically, hijack each one separately, and also give crumbs to each party leader separately, and say, "We want all of you to come and join us in this takeover," -- which is totally the US empire's wish -- "and do this."

33:09 So that's one element that is totally different in Turkey. And as I said, the Turkish people are highly, highly aware; and they really pay close attention to the history. I mean, you're looking at a country: in 1981, we had the military coup; and then we had this huge scandal in Susurluk in 1997. And it was all publicized, that these were all elements that were being managed from the above. From "the above:" I don't mean "God" or Lord, by "the above;" I mean here in the United States. So that is another big element. You have a very, very educated people there; so that is hard.

33:46 And the level of activism you see in Turkey: again, that is amazing. This is why, when people are asking me on Twitter, "What's going to happen? So, who are you rooting for?&quot I say, "I'm rooting for the Turkish people." Because Turkish people should determine what's going to happen with Erdoğan: whether or not they want to replace him, and who they want to replace him with. Because... if that is the democracy we are talking about -- instead of letting the powers here dictate through their propaganda arms and channels. Because they do have the media under control, to a large extent, in Turkey. And... this is what they need to do. They need to keep their eyes open and also learn from Egypt, learn from Libya.

34:32 And I'm not saying it because I have, like, this pride of... nationalistic pride as Turks: but you are not dealing with the same kind of people. Now, we may see some level of violence there in Turkey: whether it is through some provocation coming through Gülen's elements, or it's just simply Turkish people saying we have to take the matters in our own hands. Now, with Gülen movement, they know where these people are placed. For example, they know about Ihlas Holding. Guess who? Ihlas Holding is the guy who has hired Marc Grossman, the guy who was on top of this Operation B. So they know the individuals who are the operatives of the Gülen, CIA movement. And in Turkey, they won't have any problem of taking out some of these individuals. And I'm saying... I'm not advocating violence, but... and as I said, this is what I expect to see in Turkey and, I believe, we are going to see.

35:34 So, it's not going to be easy. It's not going be as easy as Egypt; it's not going to be as easy as Libya. And the other very important thing that Turkish people realize is -- and it happened, now, to a certain degree; it played into the Turkish pride -- they have been constantly humiliated by the EU. Because this notion kept floating in Turkey: "If we want to succeed, we have to be part of the EU." Well in the last few years, with the EU being bankrupt -- financially and politically -- what is amazing is so many people in Europe, even from Germany, they are applying for jobs in Turkey, OK?

36:12 So they are seeing that, well, their economy has been stronger than EU; it was not a great thing. It's a great thing that they didn't become part of the EU. And they see themselves as an independent nation, that "We can do well." And that, strategically-speaking, Turkey has a tremendous amount of power. They are the world's most strategic, important energy hub. Any pipeline you talk about, whether it's going to be through Azerbaijan... Shah Deniz, or any of the pipelines: without Turkey, nothing can move. I mean, they can starve Europe. They can starve Europe of natural gas and oil.

36:52 They realize this power. Maybe they don't have oil like Saudi Arabia or, to a certain degree, even Egypt. But they do have the benefit, the advantage, of a strategic position. And that would give them the power to have a say: whether that is in dealing with Russia, whether that is in dealing with China, or whether it is dealing with the United States. And that brings up another thing: with EU, I think many eyes in Turkey has become wide open: "We don't need to be part of EU. We want to be an independent nation."

37:24 The next thing they should be looking, hopefully, is the cost of being part of NATO. It always in the past has been considered as, "Well, without NATO, who could protect us against the Soviet Union?" -- this was during the Cold War. Well, we don't have the Soviet Union. And really, what benefit is NATO providing for the Turkish people? It has been nothing but cost. I mean, what happened with Syria: it is being part of NATO. It is being under the thumbs of the Western Empire. And as long as they continue that in Turkey, they will never be that independent nation that they take pride of being part of. And to do that, they need to reclaim the Turkishness as an independent country that can determine its own destiny without the foreign, outside influence and pressure.

38:15 And that's what I'm hoping to see with Turkey; and that's what I'm rooting for. Not for any party, not for Erdoğan: I'm not a fan of Erdoğan. I am a big enemy of Fethullah Gülen: I have been, and I have been saying it. I have been a lone voice here in the United States on that. But as far as what happens in Turkey, the Turkish people should be determinant of what happens from now on. And they are, right now, at this very important strategic bottleneck.

38:45 And this is why I'm shivering; this is why I decided to write this article. And that is: they have an opportunity here. If the majority of them decide, "Fine, maybe he engaged in all this corruption and things," -- which he did, Erdoğan -- "but on the other hand, maybe he has learned a lesson or two. Let's give him another chance:" that's up to the Turkish people to decide. Or if, to say, "We want some other party, we want some other leader:" again, that's up to the Turkish people. And I'm hoping that the people here in the United States forget about what's being advertised and put out as propaganda by the CNN and NPR. And please, read that article. Go through the links -- you're looking at less than a year apart -- and see how these channels -- of the US establishment -- is forming, shaping, creating mindsets and opinions and how we view the outside world -- whether it's Turkey, or it's Syria, or it's Egypt.

39:43 James: Well, you raise such an important point there; and it's one that we keep making but, I think, we have to keep stressing. It's that this is not just a binary choice: it's not Erdoğan or Gülen. Of course, there are other options out there on the table. And as you say, the Turkish people are quite awake and aware to these different possibilities and alternatives, and are suspicious of official narratives all around. So I have no doubt that they'll be engaging in this conversation, and to some extent already are. And I noticed that your article has certainly picked up the attention of the Turkish community. It raises the question of why you have not appeared more in the Turkish media to talk about these issues in the past.

40:24 Sibel: Well, Turkish mainstream media in some ways is not that different than the US media. And in some ways, actually, they are worse; because they have more freedom of playing with the facts, maybe more so than even here in the United States -- which is appalling. Initially -- when my case broke in 2002, 2003, for example -- I was interviewed by some of the top Turkish mainstream media newspapers. And of course, you know that things can get lost in translation; but certain things cannot be attributed to that. For example, they broke my case: for years, they would put "Sibel Edmonds, the CIA Agent Whistleblower." It's like, how could you... FBI, be translated to CIA? That's beyond me. But a lot of things that got so twisted and then so... and so much misinformation was placed in there that I said, "I'm not interested; and I'm not gonna engage, get engaged in, this kind of a game."

41:16 And in the past few years I have done -- not that I have been in demand by the US media -- but frequently I decline requests for interviews. First of all, I'm not interested in some two-, three-minute sound bites in interviews: "We want to find out what you think about Snowden, and you have 48 seconds to tell me." No, I'm not gonna do that, because whatever I say, they can take five words -- because that's what you have with 48 seconds -- and it can be totally taken out of context; and it can be twisted. And now we have this medium called the Internet. So I'm like... through my partners, through our Boiling Frogs Post, Corbett Report, I can put all this information; and people can come, and they can listen to it, and they can watch it. I don't need the mainstream media to have the platform to provide either some analysis or give some opinions.

42:00 So, same thing applies with Turkey. That's why I haven't done it and I'm not doing it. I will try to put this on the Twitter once the link is out, and the Turkish people can go and, if they're interested, they can listen to it. But another important thing I would like to do as part of this is... usually these types of periods, even though it's tough for Turkey or for any country when they are in this kind of a bottleneck and so much happening, there's so much chaos; it can go -- I mean, it's a very stressful period -- some good can take place and can happen under these conditions. And I'm hoping that... one of these major goods would have to do with the truth.

42:40 Because now, with Erdoğan, I am hoping that he's not as coward as Mubarak and he won't take that coward's way out, to say, "Fine, you know what? Put me in jail, or send me to UK. I'll settle, and I'll zip up." He can make a lot of information public. He can actually expose a lot on Fethullah Gülen and the Operation B Gladio. He has all that information. And he will -- even if he were to go down afterwards -- he will go down as a hero; and he would be recognized as a hero.

43:16 And he has an opportunity to do that. I know it's a really scary proposition, because we know what happens to people who decide to talk -- the leaders, you know? Nobody wants to be sodomized like Gaddafi and then be slashed into pieces. But he came... he has an opportunity here. And that would make him more popular with the Turkish people in the country than anything else. And maybe that would provide him with an opportunity to prove that real democracy can really hold and take place in Turkey.

43:49 That's number one. Number two has to do with many people who were part of the Operation B Gladio. They were part of the movements before Gülen, before 1997. A lot of those generals, a lot of those people from MIT and from the military, they have been betrayed. They see themselves as betrayed by the United States. Because when the United States, they picked Plan B: this was when they said bye-bye to a lot of those people. And we know what happened with Ergenekon: we know that some of them are in jail, and some of them are on their way to go to jail.

44:28 And I know some of them are outside the country, outside Turkey. These people have a lot of documents. They have a lot of evidence that they can just leak -- make it public -- and show the Turkish people how they have been betrayed, how they are being betrayed by the powers. And this is the perfect opportunity for those former MIT members; for those former, retired, in-exile Turkish military members; to show what has been happening and to show what the real game is. I mean, that is, if they consider themselves true nationalists -- meaning, really Turkish.

45:11 Because a lot of those people, they use the flag and they use the mustache. That's not being Turkish. If they really want to show how Turkish they are, they should show the Turkish people how the outside influence has been using them -- has been shaping their politics -- and let everything fall where they may. And this is, again, a great opportunity. Sometimes, when you have wars between the factions, then that's when you start getting the truth. And maybe this will become a great moment of truth for Turkey.

45:46 And for our audience, our American audience, who think all the stuff we are talking about here is about some internal Turkish politics: you are wrong. Because when, or if, and once... or if they come out, the truth, you are going to find a lot of answers on the real foreign policy practices and operations of the United States. You are going to find a lot of answers on 9/11. You are going to find a lot of answers, not only on al-Qadi, but you're going to find a lot of answers on Zawahiri and so much more -- which would be, partly, my case too.

46:27 And so this is not internal politics of Turkey. And the Americans have as much reason to pay attention, to follow, to support the will of the Turkish people, and to root for the truth to come out. It is going to have global implications, if those -- if they are real Turkish -- if those generals and former MIT people decide to put out some of that... operation manuals and documents. Because they have those documents and operation manuals.

47:03 James: You know, Sibel, it doesn't happen very often that I get a chill up my spine when having an interview, but that speech that you just made just did send that chill up my spine. Because it's so true that, really, the course of world history can change with the release of certain bits of information that certain people out there really are sitting on, and really could change the game altogether if they were simply to release it. So, I certainly hope that message is taken to heart by anyone with that type of information that may happen upon this conversation, or anyone who knows of people in that situation.

47:36 But at any rate, until and unless that happens, I think you're right: we do have to support the will of the Turkish people, and the Turkish people have to become engaged and aware of what is going on to an even greater extent -- and I'm sure that they already are engaged in this to a large extent. But it does raise the question: I mean, you raised the specter of the Turkish media being even more controlled than the American MSM, and I just shake my head at that thought. But that does raise the question for people who are interested in what's happening in Turkey and these Turkish political issues: where do they go for information on that that's not so biased?

48:12 Sibel: Well, there are some... just like you have been doing, there are some really, really, good blog sites -- or the independent sites: I don't think we even call those, anymore, blog sites -- of information sites that are out there. And I will try to make a list, prepare a list of those, and put it out there as a separate article. As you can see, with all the evil things that it comes with, Twitter can have some really, really major benefits; and I have been following a lot, and I have found out a lot of good links there through Twitter.

48:42 But also, one of the very important and interesting things about mainstream media, including in the United States -- mainly in the United States -- being so under control: by following and reading that, you can find out a lot, because you can actually see what the powers want to take place. For example: when you see, in this case, that Fethullah Gülen is not the party that is being pooh-poohed here by the CNN and the NPR -- and when you're seeing that it is a particular person, let's say Erdoğan -- that should tell something. It's almost like the reverse psychology. Sometimes you go to the corrupt sources to find the truth by seeing what they are not saying, or going and arriving at the opposite conclusion of what is taking place and what is happening.

49:30 And there are some very good Turkish sites that are operating from other countries. I have just started communicating with this lady who's in Australia. And again, she is very independent. She is not following any particular party in Turkey. And the other great advantage and benefit Turkey has is, unlike here in the United States, they haven't become too Internet-ized -- let me make up a word here -- and this is why we see it. We saw it in the Taksim Square with Gezi Park, but you see it all over Turkey: Turkish people, by culture -- by the way Turks are -- they are far more into human contact. Meaning, we go out there. We get together: whether it's outside the university or in some tea house over there. So that's another great thing that Turkey has going; so it makes it much easier to organize, to network, and to do things. And that's one benefit, again, that Turkey has.

50:32 And the other thing I'm seeing that is gaining some momentum with the anti-Erdoğan movement is... I know, with some of the corruption charges... and as I said, there are a lot of... many, many things that Erdoğan could spill. But Erdoğan himself, also, is putting out and is giving -- in his own way -- some clues and some tips, though, to the Turkish people. I mean, we have this news about some of these charities, Islamic charity organizations: that they had a raid with the police force; and they raided these recently; and they are saying they have connection with al-Qaeda; and...

51:14 Fine: take it from there. Because first of all, all they are saying is, "These are the charities, organizations." None of the mainstream media in Turkey or the US are getting into the history and the context of these charity organizations. If you start doing that in Turkey -- here in the United States, too, through Internet and research -- that's when you're gonna get into the real truth. Because it's very hard for Gülen movement to expose these corruptions or these shady financial networks of Erdoğan without exposing themselves. As I said, they were in the same bucket for all this time: that is, Gülen and also Erdoğan.

51:55 So it is a very slippery slope there: because when Gülen exposes a bunch of these networks that shows Erdoğan had some shady dealings, as part of that, automatically they are exposing some of their own networks -- because they were doing it together. So take those pieces of information, go much deeper. Because the media likes the soundbite of it: "Erdoğan was connected to some terrorist financier," period. You start digging in there. For example, when you're looking at al-Qadi's ownership of banks in Turkey, then you are gonna see some really big names, Turkish politicians' names.

52:37 And as I tell people, for example, this is one... maybe it sounds like an outside issue, but it's not: when they say why Putin is so silent when the FSB, Russians have so much information on Gladio Operation B, I tell them, "Well, Putin owns several bank accounts in Cyprus and has had those bank accounts since 2001. Now, Putin would not like to see that information being leaked by the Westerners, because he would be finished in Russia. And Putin also needs to pacify the nationalist faction in Russia. So yes, he has to be acting tough. But Putin cannot be too tough, because Putin's assets, a lot of Putin's assets, are in Turkey: they are actually in Cyprus banks." And I have said it repeatedly; and again, it's not very difficult for people to take it from there. Because when you start looking at some of these banks in Cyprus, you're gonna come across a lot of people -- big names, big names international and national.

53:49 James: And that's an exceptionally important subject right there, and that would get us into an entirely other conversation that I do want to have at some point. But for now: obviously, we have covered an awful lot of ground so far in this conversation. Is there any other points that you'd like to make before we wrap things up?

54:04 Sibel: I hope we will have some volunteers who may contact you through your website, James, who volunteer to translate, and do so with integrity -- because, as I said, a lot of things can be lost in translation -- to translate this interview that you just conducted with me, and also the article that I wrote, into Turkish, and put it out there. And again, I have to -- not because I'm trying to play humble -- I haven't been able to enter Turkey since 2001. After my case became public here, unofficially I became wanted in Turkey by certain factions, because... [laughs] You know why that is.

54:43 So, I haven't been in Turkey. I have been cut off from my family; and where I have been, I haven't been really in touch with... other than some written, short communication pieces with some Turkish people that I do trust. Other than that, I have been out of practice with Turkish, believe me or not. It used to be my first language; Farsi was my second language; English was my third language. And I don't know where it is, right now: my Turkish. When it comes to a lot of things that have to do with policy, with foreign policy, with politics, I would rather see someone who is a professional, up-to-date translator to translate this interview, and also translate our articles. And I would love to publish a translated version of it, also, here at Boiling Frogs Post, and also provide a link for the translated version of this interview.

55:35 James: Excellent. And of course, I would also mirror that and put that up as an annotation on the YouTube video of this as well.

55:41 Sibel: Yes, please.

55:43 James: So lots of different ways that that translation can help. All right, excellent. Well, we'll leave it there for now. Obviously this is an ongoing story, so I'm sure we'll be back to cover it in various different ways in the future; but Sibel, thank you so much for your time today.

55:55 Sibel: And thank you, James.

55:58 James [voice-over]: This video is brought to you by the subscribers of BoilingFrogsPost.com. For more information on this and other topics, please go to BoilingFrogsPost.com. For more information and commentary from James Corbett, please go to CorbettReport.com.

56:11 [END]


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This transcript by "Adjuvant" is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

changed October 29, 2014